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INTRODUCTION
Litigation can advance great moral causes. Owen Fiss has made the
case that "[a]djudication is the process by which the values embodied in
... the Constitution ... are given concrete meaning and expression."' Ac-

cording to Fiss, "[t]he social function of contemporary litigation is not to
resolve disputes, but rather to give concrete meaning to [public] morality"' ' 2 This Note will explore one moral theme behind the disparate impact

standard ("disparate impact standard") of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII"). 3 The disparate impact standard is a legal theory un-

der which employees can establish an employer's liability for
discrimination if the employer's neutral employment practice has a disproportionately negative impact on a group of workers protected by Title
VII. Under this theory, employees do not have to prove that the employer

*
Law Clerk to the Honorable John T. Nixon, United States District Court for
the Middle District ofTennessee; B.A. 1999,Vassar College;j.D. 2004, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to the staffof the MichiganJournal of Race & Law and Brent
Starks for their helpful comments and to my professors for their inspiration. I would also
like to express my deep appreciation to the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for continuing
to expand the boundaries of legal discourse.
1.
Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HuM.
BEHAv 121, 121 (1982).
2.
Id. at 124.
3.
§ 703(k)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000).
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intentionally discriminated against them.4 The disparate impact standard is
therefore an important and powerful doctrine because of its ability to
eradicate institutional barriers rooted in race-based discrimination.
Gross racial disparities continue to exist in contemporary American
workplaces with respect to pay, hiring, firing, promotions, and other employment-related practices. Research and experience show that racial
discrimination causing these disparities operates to a large extent on the
structural and subconscious levels, not at the level of intentional discrimination.' The disparate impact standard recognizes that "intentionality"
cannot fully capture the phenomenon of racial discrimination. In this way,
the disparate impact standard can serve as a symbol of the moral imperative to rid society of racial hierarchy.
Equality of citizenship is the very premise of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Clause stands as an aspiration of equal human dignity regardless of race and must require that individuals be treated with equal respect,
dignity, and value in society. This understanding of citizenship necessitates

4.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971), first held that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity." According to the Court,
"good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to explicitly include a disparate impact standard. Under section 703(a)(2) ofTitleVIl, "to limit,
segregate, or classify ... employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin" is an "unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(2000). According to the statute, after a plaintiff shows a discriminatory impact, the burden
of persuasion shifts to the defendant to show a manifest relationship to the job skills in
question or "business necessity." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. Even if the employer carries
his burden with respect to business necessity, a plaintiff may still prevail by showing that
the employer refused to adopt an alternative employment practice that satisfies the employer's legitimate business interests without having a disparate impact on a protected class.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
Disparate impact liability is permissible in the statutory, but not constitutional, context. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), established that the Equal Protection Clause
only forbids employers from engaging in intentional racial discrimination. Id. at 248.
5.
See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
6.
See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDoM's LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1997) (arguing that the Bill of Rights requires that "government must treat all those subject to its dominion as having equal moral and political
status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them all with equal concern; and it must
respect whatever individual freedoms are indispensable to those ends"); see also Una Narayan, Towards a Feminist Vision of Citizenship: Rethinking the Implications of Dignity, Political
Participation, and Nationality, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL THEORY 48, 54 (Mary Lyndon
Shanley & Uma Narayan eds., 1997).
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eliminating institutional barriers to political and social participation such
that all citizens have a fair chance to enter significant social institutions.
While the disparate impact standard should be a symbol of this
promise, recent litigation has challenged congressional power to pass civil
rights legislation and problematized the assumption that the disparate impact standard is a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section V of
the Fourteenth Amendment ("SectionV").Although both circuits to consider the issue directly have held that Congress has the power to
promulgate the legislation under Section V, they did so on narrow
grounds, 7 and an additional circuit suggested in dicta that the constitutionality of the disparate impact standard is an open question.
These challenges, and the possibility of future litigation, render the
justification for the disparate impact standard especially meaningful at this
time. A variety of legal strategies, arguments, or justifications might preserve the standard's constitutionality. In choosing a strategy, however, civil
rights litigators must recognize the consequences of setting forth arguments that do not fully embrace the doctrine they seek to advance. Some
choices could result in the disparate impact standard being narrowed or
struck down and may also make related policies harder to defend. This
Note makes the case, therefore, that the disparate impact standard should
not be defended or promoted simply as a means of "smoking out" intentional discrimination. Rather, advocates should affirmatively support the
disparate impact standard in a manner that both reflects the social reality
of institutionalized racial disparities and promotes the disparate impact
standard's great moral promise of equality of citizenship."
Part I of this Note outlines the limitations on congressional power
under Section V and their implications for justifying the constitutionality
of the disparate impact standard. Part II explores the prohibition of intentional discrimination as a justification for the disparate impact standard
and argues that justifying the disparate impact standard through this
7.

See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark. ex rel. May, 255 F3d 615, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2001)

("The Title VII 'prophylactic' response to a pattern of unconstitutional state action is proportional and congruent."); In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against the State of
Ala., 198 F3d 1305, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e conclude that in enacting the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII, Congress has unequivocafly expressed its intent to abrogate

the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and that Congress has acted pursuant
to a valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.").
8.
Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 E3d 945,952 (7th Cir. 2000) ("We leave [the
question of whether § 5 supports the disparate impact rules under Title VII] for another
day."). But see Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1544 (2005) (holding that
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act authorizes recovery in disparate impact cases
comparable to Title VII).
9.
Although Title VII's disparate impact regime protects against more than racial
discrimination, this Note focuses on race, and in particular on the experiences of Black
Americans, because this group faces some of the most profound barriers to equal employment opportunities. Moreover, most antidiscrimination law, including the disparate
impact standard, developed largely as a result of the experiences of Black Americans.
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theory, as some courts currently do, may eventually narrow disparate impact doctrine and thus constrain the possibilities for substantive equality
in employment. This Part also analogizes the limits of using an intentional
discrimination rationale to justify the disparate impact standard to the
limits of using the diversity rationale to justify affirmative action in higher
education admissions programs. It concludes by pointing out the inadequacies of alternative effects-based theories. Part III makes the case that an
equal citizenship theory, based on a moral interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, best justifies the disparate impact standard. Finally,
Part IV confronts some of the institutional issues underlying the equal
citizenship theory as a justification for the disparate impact standard and
suggests that Congress should have power under Section V both to interpret the Equal Protection Clause and to enact legislation that promotes
equal citizenship.
I.

MODERN LIMITS ON CONGRESS'S SECTION V POWER

Recent Rehnquist Court decisions have radically narrowed the
scope of congressional authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
though the Section V power.10 Although cases like Katzenbach v. Morgan"
accorded great deference to Congress to independently interpret and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,' 2 the more recent City of Boerne v.
Flores3 and its progeny 14 imply that Congress lacks power to legislate be10.
Restraints on congressional power to enact civil rights legislation are not limited
to the Section V area. For example, United States v.Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and
United States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), restricted Congress's ability to pass legislation
under the Commerce Clause.These cases raise the concern that the disparate impact standard might not be sustained under the Commerce Clause authority if challenged. Hostility
toward other "benign" race-conscious policies also raises questions about the future of
disparate impact liability. See Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 H~Av. L. Rav. 493, 587 (2003). These restrictions not only threaten the constitutionality of Tide VII's disparate impact standard, they limit congressional authority to
create new disparate impact liability under other federal statutes such as the Fair Housing
Act orTitleVI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
11.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
12.
Id. at 650 (upholding Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and stating
that "[bly including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause").
13.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14.
See Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding the Eleventh Amendment bars state employees from suing their employers in federal court for money damages
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act because, even though there was congressional intent to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity, there was no Section V
authority to do so); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding the same
with respect to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
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yond what the Fourteenth Amendment sets forth as a self-executing matter."5 The Boerne line of decisions has called into question the assumption
that existing civil rights laws, including the disparate impact standard, are,
in fact, constitutional. The Court's Nevada Department of Human Resources
v. Hibbs6 decision last term may have alleviated some of this concern, at
least with respect to the disparate impact standard as applied to racial discrimination, because it suggests Congress may be afforded more deference
than many previously thought. However, this Part concludes that even
under Hibbs, the Section V jurisprudence reinforces the intentionality justification and thus fails to adequately justify the disparate impact standard
as a means of ultimately achieving equal citizenship.
In Boerne, the Court held that congressional legislation must bear a
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented ... and the means adopted to that end.1 7 As such, courts must
differentiate between appropriate remedial legislation and an unconstitutional substantive definition of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under this
"congruence and proportionality" test, the Court has invalidated legislation enacted to further equal protection, including provisions of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.' 8 However, later in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,' 9 the Court noted
that Congress can enact prophylactic legislation through its Section V
power, thus going beyond the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 0 According to the Court, "Congress' power 'to enforce' the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to
deter violations of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including
that which is not itself
2
forbidden by the Amendment's text." 1
Hibbs is the only case in which the Court upheld legislation promulgated under Congress's Section V power under this "broader swath of
conduct" rationale. In Hibbs, the Court held that the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act'22 is a valid exercise of Section V
authority pursuant to which Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity by creating a private right of action for damages against
noncompliant states.23 In deferring to Congress to enact this provision
designed to combat a pattern of gender discrimination by states'
15.
See generally Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
16.
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
17.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
18.
See Garrett,531 U.S. at 374 (Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel, 528 U.S. at
81 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
19.
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
20.
Id. at 81.
21.
Id.
22.
29 U.S.C. 5 2612(a)(1)(C) (1993).
23.
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,726 (2003).
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family-care policies," Hibbs thus seems to place a limit on the Court's
recent SectionV jurisprudence.
At the same time, Hibbs appears to relegate the retrenchment of
Congress's legislative authority2 to areas covered by rational basis scrutiny.
In Boerne, Kimel, and Board of Trustees v. Garrett6 the court invalidated legislation related to religion, age, and disability, respectively. On the other
hand, Hibbs concerned gender-based legislation subject to intermediate
scrutiny, and Katzenbach concerned race-based legislation subject to strict
scrutiny. In light of this distinction, Hibbs may be properly read to mark
those areas in which the congressionally identified pattern of state conduct involves a classification that triggers heightened scrutiny for
deference to Congress's Section V enactments. 7 In the wake of Hibbs,
therefore, Congress might be able to legislate to protect individuals and
groups subject to heightened scrutiny but not those for whom rational
basis scrutiny is appropriate. 2'
This reading softens some of the concern that by asserting "exclusive custody of the Constitution, 29 the Court would strike down the
disparate impact standard. It is possible that the Rehnquist Court, relying
on Hibbs, would reject challenges to the constitutionality of the disparate
impact standard as applied to racial and gender discrimination under this
"broader swath of conduct" rationale. Yet this remains an open question;
even though the Hibbs majority distinguished Hibbs and Katzenbach on
the one hand from Garrett and Kimel on the other on the basis of the level
of judicial scrutiny,30 it did not explain why it limited the application to
those harms that might trigger heightened forms of scrutiny.
Id.
24.
25.
For more on this congressional retrenchment, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HAiv. L. R.Ev. 4,15 (2001).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
26.
27.
It is an open question whether classifications that require heightened scrutiny

would actually get more deference. According to Justice Rehniquist, there is a heightened
presumption against the constitutionality of such classifications. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 73637. However, it is possible that Justice Rehnquist's opinion inHibbs was deeply influenced

by his daughter's experience balancing work and family, and he may have engaged in ass

unprecedented method of intermediate scrutiny See Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words
Froin the Rehnquist Court, N.YTIMEs,July 6, 2003, at 3.

However, this analysis does not explain why the Court struck down portions of
28.
the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the scope of Congress's Section V power in
Morrison.An analysis of the points of departure between Hibbs and Morrison may illuminate
the current Section V test. For example, Hibbs details the inadequate state remedies and

previous federal legislative efforts that failed in the family-leave context.
29.

Kramer, supra note 25, at 15.

30.

538 U.S. at 735-36. The Court reasoned:
We reached the opposite conclusion in Garrett and Kimel. In those cases, the
§ 5 legislation under review responded to a purported tendency of state oi-
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Ultimately, even if the Court were to uphold a challenge to the disparate impact standard's constitutionality under Hibbs, it would still need
to do so while advancing a theory that the disparate impact standard is
designed to combat, or is congruent and proportional to combating, intentional discrimination. In cases decided before Hibbs, the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits took this approach.3 ' Both circuits upheld the disparate
impact standard in Section V challenges by relying directly on Kimel's
"broader swath of conduct" language.3 2 The Eleventh Circuit held that
Congress has the power under SectionV to apply a TitleVII disparate impact analysis to the states because it is congruent and proportional to the
33
constitutional practice of combating intentional discrimination. The
Court reasoned, "although the form of the disparate impact inquiry differs
from that used in a case challenging state action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, the core injury targeted by both methods of analysis
remains the same: intentional discrimination. 34
Despite the pragmatism of this approach, progressives and others
the disparate impact standard should not justify it simply as a
support
who
means of uncovering intentional discrimination. Using the disparate impact standard to ferret out intentional discrimination is valuable; limiting
the doctrine to this use, however, renders it almost meaningless. It is uncontested that intentional discrimination is unconstitutional in the
employment context. The disparate impact standard must therefore mean
something more. Disparate impact liability is premised on a much greater
promise than simply the remedying of intentional discrimination, and
continued reliance on the doctrine simply as an evidentiary tool to prove
intentional discrimination will cripple the doctrine's ability to create institutional change and promote social justice.

cials to make age- or disability-based distinctions.... Here, however, Con-

gress directed its attention to state gender discrimination, which triggers a
heightened level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig [v.Boren]. Because the standard for
demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more
difficult to meet than our rational-basis test ...it was easier for Congress to
show a pattern of state constitutional violations. Congress was similarly suc-

cessful in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, where we upheld the Voting Rights
Act of 1965: Because racial classifications are presumptively invalid, most of

the States' acts of race discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (full citations omitted).

31.

Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark. ex rel. May, 255 F3d 615, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2001); In re

Employment Discrimination Litig. Against the State of Ala., 198 E3d 1305, 1322 (11th

Cit. 1999).
32.

See Okndhlik, 255 E3d at 626-27; In re Employment Discrinination Litig. Against the

State ofAla., 198 F.3d at 1322.
In re Employment Discrinination Litig.Against the State ofAla., 198 F3d at 1324.
33.
Id.
at 1322.
34.
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IIJUSTIFYING THE DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD UNDER INTENTAND EFFECTS-BASED THEORIES

The congruence and proportionality test requires judges to have an
understanding of what the Equal Protection Clause means.3" At least since
Washington v. Davis, 36 it is clear that the Court interprets the Constitution
to forbid only intentional racial discrimination and not to prohibit governmental decision-making that results in disparate racial effects. The
smoking-out-intent or intentionality justification therefore may be the
most acceptable approach to sustaining the disparate impact standard's
constitutionality. As such, this Part looks critically at this intent-based theory of equal protection as a justification for the disparate impact standard
and the consequences of such a justification.
This Part begins by suggesting that as a direct matter, the intentionality justification may stifle remedies for unintentional discrimination and
discourage employees from pursuing employment discrimination claims.
As an indirect matter, civil rights advocates may find they have conceded
the terms of the debate on this crucial issue because the justification will
lend credibility to the assumption that the employment "playing field" is
equal along the lines of race. This approach may affect not only the viability of the disparate impact standard as a legal doctrine but also a whole
host of other race-conscious public policies, with the perverse consequence that the victories resulting from using an intent-based justification
may ultimately delay or deny substantive equal citizenship. Next, this Part
argues that the use of the diversity rationale in affirmative action litigation
should serve as an example of the limits of the intentionality rationale.
Finally, this Part explores an alternative effects-based justification for the
disparate impact standard and concludes that, in light of the congruence
and proportionality test, this justification simply reinforces the intentionality rationale.
A. The Intentionalityjustification
Under the intentionality rationale, racial classification is improper
and anti-individualist because it distributes benefits and burdens based on
an ostensibly unimportant trait. When justified under the theory of proving intentional discrimination, the disparate impact standard is simply an
evidentiary tool to uncover, or "smoke out" illegal-and intentional-

35.
The debate over the meaning of equal protection is also at the heart of the larger debate over the methodology of constitutional interpretation. See discussion infra
Sections III.A and IV
36.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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conduct.17 This Section sets forth some of the direct and indirect consequences of the intentionality justification for the disparate impact
standard, arguing that the use of this justification will never eradicate
structural discrimination and may ultimately impede the development of
other beneficial race-conscious public policies.
The intentionality justification is rooted in the tradition of liberal
individualism, in which individuals are promised equal process. The prohibition of intentional discrimination developed as a response to our
history of de jure segregation.38 Within the context of a segregated society,
racial classification was the principal evil and easily served as a proxy for
racial discrimination. This intentionality rationale continues to inform the
Court's current equal protection jurisprudence, under which the Court
strikes down classifications based on race unless they pass the test of strict
scrutiny (as well as neutral classifications where the perpetrator has invidious motives).
While it might be the least controversial means, justifying the disparate impact standard as one that simply prohibits intentional
discrimination will not alleviate disparities between races. As Charles
Lawrence and Mar Matsuda remind us, "in an ideal world, where each
individual is born into a community that respects and values her as much
as any other person, fair individual process is all that is needed.... But
that is not the world we live in.' ' 9 Existing racial disparities in employment illuminate the limitations of the intentionality approach: people of
color may have the right to equality in theory, but they continue to face
disadvantages as compared to Whites. One direct consequence, therefore,
of this approach is that it obviously does not remedy unintentional institutional discrimination. Yet to meet the aspiration of equal citizenship,
practices that unintentionally produce a racially disparate impact, whether
due to unconscious or subconscious racism, institutional practices, or
both, need to be remedied. An intent-based justification dramatically precludes the use of the disparate impact doctrine to combat practices that
lead to racial disparities in employment.
On average, people of color have fewer and less lucrative employment opportunities than Whites, and these employment disparities are

Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis37.
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. PEv. 1 (1976). Advocating such a position, Brest observes
that the disparate impact doctrine is a useful device to address "suspected racedependency" in governmental decision-making; however, "the doctrine cannot reasonably
be applied across the board. If disproportionate impact is to remain a useful device, it must
be used selectively and perhaps be modified to create rebuttable rather than conclusive
presumptions of discriminatory intent." Id, at 29.
See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
38.
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
39.
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MAR1 MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIvE ACTION 81 (1997).

BACK: MAKING THE
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particularly evident in blue-collar occupations. While the last thirty years
have shown some improvement, income rates continue to exist on a racial
hierarchy.4' Recent census data shows, for instance, Black women's wages
are 62% of similarly situated White men's and 85% of similarly situated
White women's .42 Among the college-educated males, White men earn

earn $45,000.41
$66,000 a year, while Hispanics earn $49,000 and Blacks

Even if the Black/White income gap were to compress at the rate it did
in the late 1990s, the fastest period of compression in history, it would still
take decades for us to experience pay equality.44 Workers of color are also
disproportionately unemployed. In 2003, 10.8% of Blacks, 7.7% of Hispanics, and 6.0% of Asians were unemployed, compared to 5.2% of
Whites.1 Typical is the midwest state of Illinois; in 1995, after a substantial
number of blue-collar jobs were lost, 75.2% of all White men over sixteen
years old were employed while the Black male employment rate was only
56.6%.

While intentionally discriminatory hiring and other employment
practices account for some of these disparities, there are also a variety of
subtler practices that limit employment opportunities for people of
color.47 In the post-Civil Rights Movement era, the principal struggle for

racial equality lies in dismantling these subtler, institutional barriers to
equal opportunity. Standing alone, a ban on intentional discrinination
does not alter the reality of racial inequality. This approach has not-and
will not-lead to substantive equality in the lives of people of color because it obscures the injuries resulting from racial inequality. 8 By focusing

40.
DER

See ROBERT CHERRY, WHO GEts THE

DISPARITIES

GOOD JOBS?:

COMBATING RACE AND GEN-

9 (2000).

41.
See Finis Welch, In Defense of Inequality, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (May 1999).
Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Facts on Working Women: Black Women in
42.
the Labor Force, available at hrtp://www.dol.gov/dol/wb/pubhc/wb-publs/bwlf97.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2005).
43.
See Income Gaps Found Among the College-Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at
A12.
44.
Economic Policy Institute, Home, available at http://wwwepinet.org (citing
statistics from

LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA

2004/2005) (last

visited Dec. 28, 2004).
45.

Economic Policy Institute, supra note 44. In the economic downturn from 2000

to 2002, people of color lost annual real income over three times as fast as Whites. For
instance, annual real income losses were -2.4% for Blacks as compared to -0.7% for
Whites. Id.
CHERRY, supra note 40, at 9.
46.
See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
47.
48.
Consider the difference between a formal right and a substantive enjoyment of
that right in the abortion context. Although women have the formal right to abortion,
states' refusals to fund abortions. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), or remove the
intimidating effects of anti-abortion activism, Bray v.Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
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on large moral victories of formal equality while leaving underlying social
inequalities intact, this model does little toward achieving substantive
equality.
Further, a strict intentionality approach allows members of any racial
group, whether or not socially disadvantaged, to bring lawsuits under the
disparate impact standard and may impede underrepresented minority
groups' access to employment opportunities. However, analyzing race in
its social context leads to the conclusion that disparate impact liability
does not make sense as applied to White persons because they are already
provided with "equal opportunity" in employment settings. Whites are
respected as full citizens. Historically, Whites have not been treated as second-class citizens or subjected to institutional barriers based on their

race.'0 In fact, the very concept of "equal opportunity" refers to providing
people of color with the opportunities already available to White people.
Another consequence of an intent-based justification may be that it

would increase the employee's evidentiary burden in disparate impact litigation. It is reasonable to presume that courts would require more
inferences of intent as an evidentiary matter if the disparate impact standard is understood simply as a means of addressing intentional
s2
discrimination5' If a case like Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the landmark
disparate impact Supreme Court case, serves as the standard in this regard,
few employees will succeed with their claims because very rarely does
there exist a set of facts providing such a strong inference of intent with-

out a direct showing. In Griggs, the Court invalidated the use of
506 U.S. 263 (1993), have made abortions difficult for women to obtain.Women have the
formal right, yet do not enjoy it substantively.
As Judge Gregory of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently stated:
49.
Disparate impact is more than a mere method of smoking out intentional
discrimination. Disparate impact attacks a set of deleterious behaviors that
the intent standard fails to capture.... Given the struggles of this nation, a

practice that has a disparate adverse impact on a protected class, and yet either has no legitimate business justification, or can be achieved in a less
harmful manner, is not a practice that we should allow to stand. Ultimately
this is a recognition by society that these practices, and their effects, are

harmful in their own right. To continue moving a healing society forward,
any such practices must be attacked under Title VII with a level of vigor
equal to that spent combating intentional discrimination.
Anderson v.Westinghouse Savannah River Co, 2005 WL 1027356, at *31 (4th Cir. May 4,

2005) (Gregoryj, ,dissenting in part).
This is not to suggest that in contemporary America,White people are not sub50.
ordinated (on the basis of, for example, gender, class, or disability), but rather that White
people are not subordinated because of theirWhiteness.
See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (2005) ("We thus
51.
squarely hold [in Griggs] that § 703(a)(2) of Title VII did not require a showing of intent.").

52.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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employment tests at a formerly de jure segregated work place. Although
the record did not contain direct evidence of intentional discrimination,
the facts-particularly the fact that the employment tests were instituted
the very day Title VII was implemented-provided exceptionally strong
circumstantial evidence that the defendant, Duke Power Company, intentionally instituted the exam requirements to keep Blacks out of the
workplace. This standard would create an unreasonably high evidentiary
burden.
Justifying the disparate impact standard on the basis of prohibiting
intentional discrimination also renders consequences that transcend disparate impact litigation. This strategy positions progressive civil rights leaders
in the difficult position of justifying legal programs and judicial doctrines
within an intent-based framework when they do not fit comfortably
within that framework. They must then use their limited resources to defend disparate impact liability as a congruent and proportional departure
from the "norm" of an intent-based standard for equal protection. Working from this position ultimately forecloses opportunities to create
innovative theoretical and practical approaches to combating institutional
barriers to full participation in employment.
Most profoundly, those that support a different justification in theory but invoke the intentionality rationale for pragmatic reasons concede
the terms of the larger debate on the meaning of equal protection. Assumptions about the relationship between race and institutional access
that are reflected in the disparate impact debate ultimately transcend that
debate. Based on the way in which this issue is discussed in disparate impact jurisprudence, the false notion that an equal playing field exists will
be further normalized when the disparate impact standard is justified under the intentionality theory. This, in turn, will inevitably be reflected in a
range of public policies and other judicial doctrines.
By way of example, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act s3 ("PRWORA") represents a public policy
influenced by false assumptions about race and institutional access. The
PRWORA fundamentally restructured welfare programs by setting new
eligibility requirements and providing states with new authority to craft
welfare programs. The bill attempted to move individuals from welfare to
work through provisions that established a lifetime limit of five years of
payment to any family and required family heads to find jobs with two
54
years.
As a policy, the PRWORA does not reflect the fact that institutional
factors play an enormous role in poor people's employment rates. Institu53.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of2, 5,7-8, 10-11,13,15,20-21,25-26,28-29,31,42 U.S.C. 1305).
54.
42 U.S.C. § 608.
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tional barriers include lack of access to education and training; employers
that do not adhere to civil rights laws; jobs that do not provide a living
wage;jobs without benefits such as health care; and access to basic support
services such as day care and transportation." Moreover, poverty disproportionately affects people of color, 6 since a disproportionate number of
individuals receiving welfare are of color. The PRWORA does nothing to
address these underlying institutional problems or to address structural
inequalities that perpetuate these racial disparities in the first place.
Not only does the bill ignore the structural inequalities, but it actually blames people of color for their poverty. While the PRWORA is
"race-neutral" on its face, those pushing the bill relied on racial stereotypes, either consciously or unconsciously, to influence votes. 57 For
example, the House of Representatives' proposal cited statistics of Black
behavior, including illegitimacy rates and the correlation between Black
male criminality and single parent families.5 ' In this context, House
Speaker Newt Gingrich explicitly attributed Black people's poverty to
laziness. 9 The bill's promoters essentially blamed poverty on the supposed
moral failure of the Black community.
It is no wonder that the bill has not been successful.While there has
been a reduction in the welfare caseload and overall poverty rate in the
wake of the PWORA, 60 most of those who have made the transition
from welfare to work have moved into low-income jobs with little or no
room for advancement, low job security, and inadequate resources to balance work and family. 61 Moreover, the economic troubles of the poorest
fifth of single mothers was worse five years after the PRWORA passed
55.

See

generally National

Partnership

for Women

&

Families,

Home, at

http://www.nationalpartnership.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
56.
Poverty disproportionately affects people of color, especially women of color. In
2004, approximately 24% of Blacks and 23% of Hispanics lived below the federal poverty
line, compared to 8.2% of Whites. CPS, 2004 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macrc/032004/pov/toc.htni (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
Poverty, and its corresponding racially disparate impact, is much worse for single-women
headed households. For example, while 22.5% of White single mothers live in poverty,
38.8% of Hispanic single mothers and 39.3% of Black single mothers live in poverty. National Center for Children in Poverty, Child Poverty Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.nccp.org/fact.html (last visited Dec. 28,2004).
57.

See

DOROTHY

ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND

217-25 (1997) (arguing that the following myths about welfare
and reproduction influenced the passage of the 1996 welfare legislation: "welfare induces
childbirth"; "welfare causes dependency"; and "marriage can end children's poverty").
Id.
58.
59.
Id. (citing DeWayne Wickham, Gingrich Blames Poorfor Self-Made Poverty, USA
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY

July 3, 1995, at All) (regarding Gingrich's comments in pushing the Contract
With America, for which the House's Personal Responsibility Act of 1995 was a key provision).
See National Partnership for Women & Families, supra note 55.
60.
61.
Id.(section on Welfare Reform Legislation).
TODAY,
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than at the time it was instituted, despite the strong economy of the late
1990s. 6' The bill was based on the assumption that the playing field was
equal. This assumption lead to the conclusion that people of color were to
blame for being disproportionately poor and that poor people would be
better off if the government forced them to work.
The PRWORA thus serves as an example that false assumptions
about race and institutional access-that all individuals have equal opportunities and therefore people of color are poor because of their moral
failings-can result in policies that are unsuccessful and that perpetuate
racial disparities and stereotypes. Indeed, only if one assumes that the
playing field is equal can policies such as the PRWORA be considered
reasonable.Yet importantly, it would be difficult to find strong evidentiary
proof of racially discriminatory intent underlying the PRWORA. The
disparate impact standard, and discourse based on the equal citizenship
theory of equal protection animating the standard, can serve to challenge
false assumptions about institutional access.
Civil rights strategies that focus on the intentionality theory of
equal protection have yielded profound substantive gains that cannot be
discounted. Doors of opportunity have opened for people of color as a
result of intent-based arguments, providing individuals with greater space
to lead dignified lives. Access to the various benefits of full citizenship,
including more equitable employment opportunities, has greatly increased.
Despite the progress made through the use of intent-based arguments, however, a justification for disparate impact that relies exclusively
on the intent standard assumes that the playing field is equal and fails to
address the problem of institutional racism.While the intent-based rationale is undoubtedly one method ofjustifying the disparate impact standard,
it seems clear that to preserve the distinct benefits available under the different standards, disparate impact must also mean something more.
B. Affirmative Action and InsufficientJustifications
The current assault against affirmative action-in the media, the
courts, and public opinion-signals that when weakly and apologetically
defended, even remedial race-conscious policies may be narrowed or
attacked on the constitutional level. Although the constitutionality of
race-conscious admissions policies in higher education was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger on diversity grounds,63 the justification for affirmative action should not hinge on this rationale. Certainly,

62.
63.

Wendell Primus, "hat Next for Welfare Reform, 19 BROOKINGS REV. 17 (2001).

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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diversity is an important goal." However, diversity is best understood as a
beneficial consequence, not the central mission, of affirmative action programs." Continued reliance on the diversity rationale to support affirmative
action programs will stifle the social benefits of those programs.
Affirmative action was not initially conceptualized as a tool to enhance diversity in education. When first promulgated in the 1960s,
affirmative action programs were understood as means of increasing access
to institutions from which Blacks had been excluded under force of law.66
Despite this, California defended the first lawsuit challenging affirmative
67
action in education on, among others, diversity grounds. In response,
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v.Bakkem
64.
Even the brief submitted by the Bush Department ofJustice argued that diver
sity is an important goal. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Grutter,539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) ("Ensuring that public institutions, especially educational institutions, are open and accessible to a broad and diverse aray of individuals, including
individuals of all races and ethnicities, is an important and entirely legitimate government
objective.").
Diversity is important in the employment setting as well. The "functional theory of
diversity" submits that workplaces can be more efficient and productive if they have a
diverse employee base. Lani Guiner & Susan Sturm, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 C.k. L. REV. 953, 1019 (1996). Guinier and Sturm argue,
"work-team heterogeneity promotes more critical strategic analysis, creativity, innovation,
and high-quality decisions." Id. at 1024.
See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Pref65.
erential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of theTerms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11
HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 17-18 (1994).
66.
According to Lawrence and Matsuda, "[the deep meaning of affirmative action ...
recognizes that the only remedy for racial subordination based on the systemic establishment
of those structures, institutiom, and ideologies is the systematic disestablishment of these
structures, institutions, and ideologies. LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 39, at 27.
The phrase "affirmative action" was first used in an Executive Order by President
Johnson that required federal contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11,246 (Sept. 24, 1965). Explaining the affirmative action concept, Johnson said, "This is the next and more profound
stage of the battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity-not just
legal equity but human ability-not just equality as a right and a theory, but equality
as a fact and as a result." President Lyndon Johnson, Speech at Howard University Graduation (June 4, 1965), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/
speeches.hom/650604.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
67.
Brief for Petitioners at 44, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (No. 76-811). Section ifof the brief is entitled "An Admissions Program Adopted
Voluntarily by a State Medical School to Counter the Effects of Pervasive Discrimination
and to Secure the Educational Benefits of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in a Student Body
Accords with the Equal Protection Clause." Petitioners argued, for example, "it would be
nonsense to conclude that an absence of de jure discrimination blocks the Davis faculty
from voluntarily adopting race-conscious means to promote racial and ethnic diversity in
the student body." Id. at 64. The Regents of the University of California also made arguments about remedying general discrimination.
68.
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.).
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established the legal basis for the diversity argument, which became the
leading rationale for affirmative action. To comply with the holding in
Bakke, many universities rewrote their affirmative action policies, justifying them with diversity language. Enrolling a diverse student body was
also the sole rationale asserted by the University of Michigan Law School
in defense of its policy 9 The school argued that achieving a diverse stu-

dent body is a compelling state interest, and that its program was narrowly
tailored to that end." The media's coverage of Grutter correspondingly
framed afirmative action in diversity terms. 7 ' And most importantly, the

Supreme Court essentially adopted Powell's opinion as its holding.
The diversity rationale as a primary, or sole, justification for affirmative action presents at least one immediate problem: the programs risk
legal challenges on narrow tailoring grounds.73 In fact, since the Court
held that diversity is a compelling government interest, narrow tailoring is
perhaps the strongest argument against many affirmative action programs.
This reasoning served to invalidate the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy" Even the Court that upheld the policy at
issue in Gruaer was deeply divided on this issue. 5 As Justice Scalia observed in his Grutter dissent,"[s]ome future lawsuits will presumably focus
on whether the discriminatory scheme in question contains enough
evaluation of the applicant 'as an individual,' and avoids 'separate admissions tracks,' to fall under Grutter rather than Gratz. 7 6 Some schools have
already changed or eliminated programs, such as race-based orientation
programs, out of fear that they might be vulnerable to litigation on the

69.

See Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-

241).

70.
Id. at 3 ("[Mleaningful interaction among students of different racial backgrounds improves the quality of education at the law school in many important ways.").
71.
See University of Michigan, Summer of News Coverage, available at http://www.
umich.edu/-urel/admissions/releases/suninary.html (last visited Jan. 5,2005).
72.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
73.
An additional practical problem may be that the diversity rationale does not
easily transcend the educational context. Courts have been less favorable to the diversity
argument as support for affirmative action in employment, particularly in cases with no
demonstrated history of racism. See Taxnan v. Bd. of Educ., 91 E3d 1547, 1563 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding educational benefits derived from a racially diverse faculty an impermissible basis for an affirmative action program underTitleVII).
74.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) ("We conclude, therefore, that because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly
tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
75.
Gntter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Scalia,J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J. in dissenting: "I do not believe, however, that the University of
Michigan Law School's means are narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts").
76.
Id. at 348 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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grounds that the racial classifications are not narrowly tailored to the
school's diversity interest. 7
The tactical decision to rely solely on the diversity rationale in the
affirmative action litigation context poses some of the same dangers as
relying solely on the intentionality rationale in the disparate impact context. Reliance on the diversity rationale concedes the terms of the debate
over the reality of race and institutional access, placing progressive civil
rights activists in a defensive position. A justification that highlights the
institutional practices that result in racial disparities in education and challenges the assumption that affirmative action is a deviation from an
otherwise properly functioning meritocracy 5 would be more in line with
the original aspiration of affirmative action programs.
There are a variety of built-in institutional preferences for Whites in
education--such as traditional admissions criteria, non-need-blind admissions, and alumni preferences 79-that belie the notion of an existing
meritocracy The diversity rationale does not, on its own, challenge the
assumption that a level playing field exists in education or point to preferences forWhites and their resultant racial disparities. Rather, the rationale
can sit comfortably with the assumption that people of color are not
qualified enough to succeed in elite institutions.
On the other hand, the diversity argument was perhaps the only
hope for sustaining the constitutionality of the Michigan programs. This
consideration pushed civil rights advocates and the University to make a
strategic choice to ignore the extent to which the University's own admissions practices actually discriminated against people of color. They
believed that only through the diversity argument did they have a chance
to win the case and retain the affirmative action programs. From a stare
decisis view, Bakke practically mandated such an argument. However, the
costs of this approach are significant.
To work toward the larger goal of equal citizenship, civil rights litigators should revive the original understanding of affirmative action as a
means of access for people of color and other underrepresented groups.
The programs should be conceptualized as tools to open previously
closed doors in order to increase social participation and ensure that all
individuals are treated with equal respect and dignity, regardless of their
race. Understood in this way, affirmative action focuses on institutional
For example, in 2004, the University of Michigan Law School discontinued an
77.
orientation program designated for students of color and replaced it with a program open
to all incoming students.
78.
See Anicus Brief on Behalf of a Concerned Coalition of Black Graduates from
ABA Accredited Law Schools, Grutter, 539 U-S. 306 (No. 02-241), reprinted in 9 MICH. 1.
RACE &

L. 5 (2003),

79.
See, e.g., id.; Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, The Preference of Mhite Privilege, African American Policy Forum Official Website, available at http://www.aapf.org/
pages/preference.htm1 (last visited Jan. 3, 2005).
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practices. This understanding challenges the assumption that educational
institutions operate with a clear, objective, and fair set of criteria)0 In this
respect, the equal citizenship rationale operates in the same way in the
context of both affirmative action and disparate impact law.
The current legal and political assault against affirmative action
should inspire civil rights litigators to defend race-conscious policies like
the disparate impact standard in a manner that highlights the fundamental
problem of institutional bias. Not only does the diversity rationale open
the door to further constitutional challenges on narrow tailoring grounds,
it detracts from an understanding of the original and most important
goals of affirmative action: breaking down barriers to participation and
promoting substantitive equality.
C. The Equality of Results Justification
Civil rights advocates have long criticized the intentionality theory
and offered other models of equal protection. Some of these models justify the disparate impact standard as a means of achieving equal effects or
results. To justify the disparate impact standard in this way, one could focus
exclusively on employment outcomes and advocate a complete redistribution of racial privilege. This position would not accept a compelling
justification for inequality, such as provided for through the use of Title
VII's business necessity defense, but instead would require equal and proportional results.
Embracing such a theory, Owen Fiss asserts that racial groups that
are perpetually at the bottom of society have the right to distributive, as
well as compensatory, justice."' While the Court has never embraced this
approach as a constitutional matter, it has held that such effects may sometimes be considered. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 Grutter v Bollinger,8"
and the majority-minority districting cases,84 for example, the Court has
permitted legislatures and state decision-makers to consider the racial effects of governmental decision-making as long as race is not the sole
consideration.
However, overwhelming judicial and political opposition accompany
effects-oriented legal doctrines. Hostility to this approach may actually be
responsible for the Court's retrenchment of the civil rights doctrines as a
80.

See Harris & Narayan, supra note 65, at 15.

81.

Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PIL. & PuB. AFF. 107

(1976).
82.
83.
84.
(1993).

401 US. 424 (1971).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
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constitutional matter. The majority in Washington v. Davis" was deeply
troubled by exactly this theory of equal protection and accordingly refused to constitutionalize disparate impact liability. There, the Court
expressed concern that laws forbidding a disparate impact "would be farreaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes."' 6 Hostility toward anything like proportional racial representation is
also visible in the affirmative action debate. Consider that in 1993, after
the media dubbed Lani Guinier a "quota queen:' former President Clinton withdrew her nomination as Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights and declared her ideas "undemocratic.""' More recently, Justice
O'Connor's Grutter opinion devoted an entire section to qualifying how
the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program is
not a quota system. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, the Law School's
"mystical 'critical mass' justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind. The admissions statistics show it to be
a sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions."' 9
In a constitutional challenge, relying on an effects-based justification
for the disparate impact standard would certainly be a more difficult path
than relying on the intentionality justification. It would require arguing
that Davis was wrongly decided and that an equal protection violation
could thus be shown through the racially disparate impact of a facially
neutral rule. The normative and political opposition to this, and, of course,
the constitutional entrenchment of the intent doctrine itself, makes it a
difficult course of action.
The other option, which may prove more attractive, is for advocates
to push for a larger congressional space to interpret the Constitution. In
light of the Boerne jurisprudence, one could argue that the effects-based
theory of justifying the disparate impact standard is congruent and proportional to the Court's theory and justification, which rest on the idea of
intentionality. In practice, however, relegating the effects-based doctrine to
the statutory setting does not move much beyond the intent-based rationale. Considering the Court's current practice of judicial supremacy or

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
85.
86.
Id. at 248.
87.
See, e.g., Rob Richie & Jim Naureckas, Quota Queen or Misquoted Queen, EXTRA,
July/Aug. 1993, available at http://www.fair.org/extra/best-of-extra/guinier-queen.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2004). According to the authors,"[a] media tactic against Guinier was
to dub her a 'quota queen,' a phrase first used in a Wall Street Journal op-ed (4/30/93) by
Clint Bolick, a Reagan-era Justice Department official. The racially loaded term combines
the 'welfare queen' stereotype with the dreaded 'quota,' a buzzword that almost killed the
1991 Civil Rights Act." Id.
88.
Gmtter, 539 U.S. at 334. ("[T]o be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system.").
89.
Id. at 346-47 (Scaha,J., dissenting).
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exclusivity, it still reifies intentionality as the constitutional baseline for
determining an equal protection violation.
In this way, intent- and effects-based theories ultimately both obscure what is at stake in understanding the disparate impact standard.The
next Part explores a third theory of the Equal Protection Clause-equal
citizenship-and argues that equal citizenship, and its promise of equal
opportunity, best captures the moral core of the Fourteenth Amendment
in order to justify the disparate impact standard.
III. THE

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP JUSTIFICATION

The third-and best-justification for the disparate impact standard
is as a means of promoting equal citizenship. This basis for equal protection is aspirational. It is grounded in the moral ideal that all individuals
and groups should be treated with equal respect, dignity, and value in society.90 The equal citizenship paradigm ultimately requires breaking down
institutional barriers that impede opportunities for political and social
participation such that all citizens have a fair chance to enter significant
social institutions, including places of employment.91 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed this principle, a moral reading
of the Equal Protection Clause leads to this understanding. As such, this
theory first requires some discussion of the legitimacy of using morality as
a source of constitutional interpretation.
A. A Moral Reading of the Constitution
Moral interpretation challenges judges to draw on a set of values,
morals, and passions in interpreting the concrete applications of vague
constitutional provisions.92 This Section explores how the moral methodology is particularly important when interpreting the Reconstruction
Amendments, because their meanings are vague at the textual level and
debatable at the moral level. The moral reading is also valuable because it
explains a current method of constitutional interpretation that will be
difficult, if not impossible, to change because "politics" and "law" are not
easily-if at all--distinguishable.

90.

See Narayan, supra note 6, at 54; see also DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 7.

91.

See generally Harris & Narayan, supra note 65, at 17-18.

92.

See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 2; see also SORTIRiOs BARBER, ON WHAT THE CON-

STITUTION MEANS 39-62 (1984) (arguing that the Constitution is coherent only if we
choose to understand it in light of our current best conception of the "good society");
Sortirios Barber, Fidelity and the Constitutional Aspirations, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1757
(1997).
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According to Ronald Dworkin, "the moral reading proposes that we
all-judges, lawyers, citizens-interpret abstract [constitutional] clauses on
the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice."93 He argues:
I believe that the principles set out in the Bill of Rights, taken
together, commit the United States to the following political
and legal ideals: government must treat all those subject to its
dominion as having equal moral and political status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat them all with equal concern; and
it must respect whatever individual freedoms are indispensable
to those ends....
For Dworkin, there appears to be an ascertainable truth as to the meaning
of every constitutional provision. To determine the meaning or principle
of a certain Amendment is "a question of... translation. We must try to
find language of our own that best captures, in terms we find clear, the
content of what the 'framers' intended it to say."' 5 Dworkin suggests that
tools such as the structural design of the Constitution and "past legal and
political practice ',96 should also inform Constitutional interpretation.
According to Dworkin, the methodology itself and "constitutional
integrity" serve as meaningful restraints on the morally-based definitions
judges may give to the Constitution. The methodological restraint derives
from looking at the framers' intent from a contextualized audience meaning, rather than determining what they actually thought. He states, "just as
our judgment about what friends and strangers say relies on specific information about them and the context in which they speak, so does our
understanding of what the framers said" 97 Constitutional integrity further
restrains judges by requiring that they not use a personal moral interpretation. He says that judges "may not read the abstract moral clauses as
expressing any particular moral judgment, no matter how much that
judgment appeals to them, unless they find it consistent with the structural design of the Constitution as a whole [and] the dominant lines of
past constitutional interpretation."9'
While Dworkin's restraints are meaningful attempts to keep judges
from acting as super-legislatures, they are limited in practice because of
the subjective nature of constitutional interpretation. Dworkin's first limit,
looking to the framers' intent in their legal and political context, involves
a set of ideological choices. Historical analysis inevitably requires the
93.

DWORIN, supranote 6,at 2.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
at 7-8.
Id.
at 8.
Id.
at 9-10.
Id.
at 10.
Id.
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privileging of certain positions and events. For example, Runyon v.
McCrary" fostered an intense debate among historians as to whether the
framers intended Section

'
1 9 8 1 , 00

an antidiscriniination statute, to apply to

private contracts. However, even if Section 1981 was not meant to apply
to private contracts, privileging the framers' intent in this respect arguably
would continue to institutionalize racial subordination because it would
legally justify practices intended to elevate the status of Whites. Whether
to give power to that intent, in other words, is a moral choice. Second, it
is not possible for judges to completely separate themselves from their
personal moral reading and act with Dworkin's "constitutional integrity."
Law is not, and can never be, completely objective and apolitical.The rule
of law has developed ideologically and involves political choices."'
Even without Dworkin's restraints, the moral reading is a critical
method of constitutional interpretation, particularly with respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment, for at least three reasons. First, the Amendment's
meaning is not self-evident, so it lends itself to subjective and moral interpretation. Its language sets forth philosophical and abstract principles that
do not easily lend themselves to uniform interpretation or application.
People inevitably bring their life experiences and personal morality to
bear on its understanding. For this reason, equal protection, in particular,
has been one of the most highly contested and changing areas of law.
Second, to the extent that one believes that the Fourteenth
Amendment seeks to provide all citizens with equal respect and dignity,
the moral reading is anti-authoritarian and anti-elitist. The elite American
legal and political culture has historically preferred "reason" over passionate or moral-based decision-making. In elaborating a conception of the
separation of powers, Madison argues in The Federalist No. 49 that "it is
the reason of the public alone that ought to controul [sic] and regulate
the government.The passions ought to be controulled [sic] and regulated
by the government1) 0' 2 This desire to restrain the people's passions or
moral sensibilities is the antithesis of equal respect and dignity.
While elites have expressed a preference for "reason," groups without power have historically used moral reasoning-based on their lived
experiences-to bring about legal and social change. For example, the
tactics of the Civil Rights Movement and the women's movement explicitly drew on morality. These movements demonstrate how morality has
been an effective tool to challenge the status quo and bridge the divide
between elites and the disempowered.

99.
100.
101.
102.

427 U.S. 160 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1998).
THE FEDERALIST No.49 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Finally, judges already use their moral convictions as a source of
constitutional interpretation. David Strauss has argued that constitutional
theory should both account for the reality of constitutional practice by
illuminating its ongoing contours and have normative appeal. 0 3 The
moral reading fits this framework. First, it is an intellectual farce to believe
that judges are not already incorporating a moral reading into their work.
Even Dworkin admits,"the moral reading is not revolutionary in its practice. Lawyers and judges, in their day-to-day work, instinctively treat the
Constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be
applied to concrete cases through fresh moral judgments.'""t He finds evidence for this in judges' conservative or liberal outcomes; he states that
"the best explanation of the differing patterns of judges decisions lies in
their different understandings of central moral values embedded in the
Constitution's text.' '0
Second, on the normative level, it is neither possible nor desirable to
completely divorce politics from law-to remove ourselves from our social context and ideological underpinnings-to be "objective." As the
Critical Legal Studies movement taught, the rule of law itself is not
objective. Moreover, equal application of normatively biased rules will not
remedy the underlying bias. So in this case, the descriptive practice of
constitutional law-the moral reading-is already doing the normative
justificatory work.
Moral interpretation has received its share of criticism. First, critics
argue that it is an authoritarian, and thus anti-democratic, methodology
since judges-members of the elite-will institute their own, arguably
elitist, moral values. This concern is heightened for federal litigation, such
as Title VII, as federal judges are unelected and represent an advantaged,
non-representative demographic of the American population. These
judges, the argument goes, have a set of moral imperatives that will represent and reinforce the status quo. This argument is supported by the
worry that the judiciary's institutional power-through doctrines such as
stare decisis and the Supreme Court practice of judicial supremacy and
judicial sovereignty 6--can ingrain judges' moral convictions into constitutional law in a way that has significant long-lasting implications.
Second, critics have suggested that the moral reading is vague and
unspecific and therefore non-justiciable. They argue that the theory does
not illuminate what exactly "equal respect and dignity" means, how it
should be applied, what the test should be, and whether the same test is
applicable to all races. A final criticsm is that morality should not, on a
normative level, be a source of constitutional interpretation because it is
103.
See David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHr. L. REv.
877,879 (1996).
104.
DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 3.

105.

Id.at 7-8.

106.

See generally Kramer, supra note 25.
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unprincipled, arbitrary, and contrary to the rule of law. This argument is
rooted in the theory that judges are capable of striving for objectivity.
Critics optimistically suggest that there are moments in constitutional law
where judges have refused to adopt their preferred personal
reading and
17
instead took a more "principled" or "objective" position.
The first two criticisms, that the moral reading is anti-democratic
and non-justiciable, represent valid concerns about invoking the moral
reading in a court-centered model of constitutional interpretation. However, when Congress has space to interpret and enforce the Constitution,
these criticisms lose their force. Tb the extent the moral reading appears
unprincipled, it bears repeating that law and politics cannot be separated.
The constitutional moments that scholars point to in support of an objective rule of law approach, when there appears to be a space between a
judge's constitutional interpretation and his politics, are very rare. So it is
questionable whether objectivity is even a practical goal to strive for. At
the same time, it is fair to suggest that judicial pronouncements are more
worrisome than legislative pronouncements because they can be longerlasting and more authoritative. However, this objection does not render
the moral reading a deficient interpretational methodology but rather
highlights the need to discuss an institutional remedy. One remedy, providing Congress broad interpretive space, is discussed in the concluding
Part of this Note.
B. The Underlying Theory in the Employment Context
The Equal Protection Clause serves as the textual basis for the aspiration of equal citizenship. According to Kenneth Karst, "the equality that
matters in our Supreme Court is ...the equality guaranteed in the Equal
Protection Clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and elsewhere in the
Constitution. That constitutional equality draws on an egalitarian ideal
that has evolved from the colonial era to our own time."'0 8 For Karst, the
Fourteenth Amendment creates a positive right to equal citizenship: "The
equal citizenship principle that is the core of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment does have substantive content, and, to be sure, that content
is properly stated in the form of a right. It is the presumptive right 'to be
treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.""°9 This theory of equal citizenship can be read to require
107.

Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is one exam-

ple. There, Justice Holmes famously argued that the Court was constitutionalizing a
preference for laissez-faire capitalism. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes,J., dissenting).
108.
Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. PRv.245, 247 (1983).
t09.

Id. (quoting Kenneth L.Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal

Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977)). See generally
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: SELECTIONS FROM THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERI-
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the removal of institutional and structural barriers that result in a racially
disparate impact in the workplace.
Institutional arrangements, both external and internal to the labor
market, limit employment opportunities for people of color." External to
the labor market, our communities are profoundly unequal along the lines
of race.' and are marked by a lack of equal opportunity in education,
transportation, health care, and other services. Each of these bears on the
ability to gain access to employment opportunities. Even when these barriers are transcended, people of color face obstacles in entering
employment institutions for reasons that include selection criteria that fail
to accurately reflect necessary job qualifications and disparities in wealth
and power that obstruct networking and other employment-related opportunities." 2 For example, the privileged position of White workers in
many blue-collar industries is accentuated by the widespread practice of
relying on recommendations from current employees when job openings
113

occur.

Once in the workplace, people of color face additional internal obstacles to full participation. For example, the culture of the "old boys
network" in many workplaces leads to a shortage of available mentoring
opportunities for women and people of color". or a lack of access to
(Kenneth Karst et al. eds., 1989); KENNETH KARsT, EQUALITY AND THE
(1989); KENNETH KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S ExPREssIoN: VISIONS OF
POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993);William Forbath, Caste,
CAN CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION

Class, and Equal Citizenship,98 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1999).
110.
See Harris & Narayan, supra note 65, at 17-18 ("[T]he equal opportunity and
full citizenship model appropriately shifts our attention to the here and now, focusing on
the ways in which people continue to face institutional obstacles to equal consideration
and equal treatment.").
See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID
111.
(1993); GREGORY D. SQuIpREs: CAPITAL AND COMMUNITY IN BLACK AND WHITE: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE, CLASS, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT (1994); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET
AL.,

OPPORTUNITIES

DENIED,

OPPORTUNITIES

DIMINISHED:

RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

IN

HmING 91-99 (1991).
112.
Even where Whites and people of color seem to be on an equal playing field,
Whites often have more opportunities in the workforce. in a 2004 study where young
Black and White testers filled out job applications for entry level jobs with nearly identically assigned interpersonal styles and education, employment, and criminal histories,

Blacks were less than half as likely as their White counterparts to receive consideration by
employers. Devah Pager, Consequences of Incarceration and Racial Disparities, 108 AM. J. Soc.
937 (2003). Moreover, Whites with criminal records received callbacks seventeen percent
of the time, while Blacks with no criminal history received callbacks fourteen percent of
the time. Id.
See CHERs, supra note 40, at 9.
113.
114.
See Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARv. L. Rev. 1749, 1816-32 (1990) (arguing that "sex segregation persists ... [because]
...
employers structure opportunities and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to disempower most women from aspiring to and succeeding intraditionally
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clients in certain professions. Other internal obstacles include workplace
harassment" ' and a lack of affordable childcare. More subtle internal obstacles exist as well; for example, Floyd Weatherspoon has found that
Black men are "assigned the less desirable duties in [the workplace, are]
more often accused of and terminated for sexual harassment, [are] monitored more closely, receive[] lower performance
evaluations, and are
' 6
continuously confronted with hostility." 1
Unconscious biases lead to the development and maintenance of
these obstacles. " 7 A large and growing body of psychological and sociological literature recognizes that people are not always aware of their racial
biases. Organizational sociologists have observed that, to a significant degree, discriminatory human behavior within organized settings such as the
workplace rarely occurs at a high level of consciousness." 8 This unconscious or subconscious racism thus contributes to the development and
maintenance of institutional biases.119
male jobs"); see also Tristin K. Green, Discriminationin Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R-C.L_ L.Rv. 91, 91 (2003) (stating
workplace discrimination often "takes form in a fluid process of social interaction, perception, evaluation, and disbursement of opportunity. It creeps into everyday impressions of
worth and assignment of merit on the job, lurking constantly behind even the most honest
belief in equality, perpetuating the very injustice that we decry").
115.
See Schultz, supra note 114, at 1833.
116.
Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination Against African
American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36
WASHBURN

L.J. 23,31 (1996).

117.
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 1161, 1165
(1995) (arguing that cognitive and cognitive-social psychology teaches that many employcrs make biased employment decisions that reflect not discriminatory motive but "normal
human cognitive functioning"); Charles R. Lawrence I1, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987); see also
Devon W Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth
Black Woman, 11 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
701,701 (2001) ("[T]he theory of identity performance is that a person's experiences with
and vulnerability to discrimination are based not just on a status marker of difference ...
but also on the choices that person makes about how to present her difference."); Devon
W Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000) (focusing on employee conduct and discussing whether it is legitimate for employees to be
pressured to behave in particular ways to avoid discrimination).
118.
See generally Ian F Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism:Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory of Racial Discrimination,109YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
119.
See Lawrence, supra note 117, at 322. Lawrence argues, "a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation."
Id.
To account for this reality, he suggests that courts should interpret the "cultural meaning" of allegedly discriminatory actions. Id.Many legal academics have expanded on
Lawrence's groundbreaking work. For example, Ian F Haney Lopez argues that as part of
the institutional structure, individuals "fail to recognize their reliance on racial notions, and
indeed may stridently insist that no such reliance exists, even while acting in a manner that
furthers racial status hierarchy." Haney Lopez, supra note 118, at 1723.
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Breaking down these institutional barriers is a precondition to
meaningful social participation. According to Uma Narayan:
[A] variety of policies that work to reduce disparities, ensure
equal access to the workplace, provide quality education and
affordable childcare might be grounded not only in terms of
their value to the particular lives of individual citizens, but also
in terms of their enabling a variety offorms of citizen participation
in national political life. Such provisions and policies need to be
understood in part as social preconditionsfor the possibility of politically active citizens who are vital to the political health of liberal
democratic societies. ' 20
Social participation is an integral component of one's social worth. As
Kenneth Karst argues, "[t]he values of participation and responsibility
contribute to an individual's self-respect, but they also have independent
significance in a political tradition that emphasizes not only doing but
belonging."' 2 ' Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that the elimination of structural barriers is a precondition to democracy itself.'22 And
as the Grutter Court recognized, "[elffective participation by members of
is essential if the
all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation
'
123
realized.'
be
to
is
indivisible,
Nation,
one
of
dream
Employment is one of the most important forms of social participa21 4
'
tion. Among other things, employment links individuals with education,
housing, insurance, benefits, social networks, and personal identity. These
mechanisms are fundamental for social participation. As Lani Guinier and5
Susan Sturm observe, employment functions as a "proxy for citizenship."''
Similarly, Judith Sklar argues that work is at the core of citizenship. She
asserts that "a citizen is neither an aristocrat or a slave, but an econormically productive and independent agent."'26 Ensuring equal employment
opportunities for people of color is a cornerstone of a society that values
equal citizenship. Indeed, the exclusion of people of color from desired
employment positions has reinforced existing social inequalities and has

120.

Narayan, supra note 6, at 58.

121.

Karst, supra note 108, at 248.

122.
MENT

See generally AMY
(1996).

GUTMANN & DENNIS THoMPsoN, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREE-

123.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,332 (2003).
124.
The equal citizenship approach to equal protection applies beyond the employment context to, for example, housing and education. The model also applies beyond race
to all social categories that define and have the ability to circumscribe one's social participation, for example, class, gender, and sexual orientation.
125.
Guinier & Sturm, supra note 64, at 1031.
126.

JUDITH SKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION

64 (1991).
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been central to their second-class citizenship.)2 So in practice, the removal
of institutional and structural barriers is necessary to guarantee equality of
opportunity in employment. Equal opportunity is essential to realizing
the aspiration of equal citizenship, because equal opportunity in employment provides a basis for real social participation.
Despite existing barriers to access, there endures a myth that all individuals have equal opportunities in employment. Therefore, critics argue
that advocating equal opportunity reinforces a racist and class-biased
structure and actually perpetuates institutional biases because it assumes
the legitimacy of the free market. For example, Kimberl& Crenshaw argues that the "myth of equal opportunity ... explains and reinforces
broader class hierarchies." 128 She explains:
Racism, combined with equal opportunity mythology, provides a rationalization for racial oppression, making it difficult
for Whites to see the Black situation as illegitimate or unnecessary. If Whites believe that Blacks, because they are
unambitious or inferior, get what they deserve, it becomes that
much harder to convince Whites that something is wrong with
the entire system. Similarly, a challenge to the legitimacy of
continued racial inequality would force Whites to confront
myths about equality of opportunity that justify for them
whatever measure of economic success they may have attained. 129
Crenshaw is correct to point to the myth of equal opportunity, as well as
the central role of a racist ideology inimical to the value of equal citizenship. However, racial and economic hierarchy is not the inevitable
outcome of endorsing the idea of equal opportunity. Understood within
the context of equal citizenship, an equal opportunity ideal cannot justify

127.
While observing the critical link between employment and citizenship, Uma
Narayan rightly urges that "we need to be careful not to reinforce the assumption that
engaging in waged work is a necessary condition for individuals to deserve the social standing and to warrant the rights and dignity associated with citizenship." Narayan, supra note
6, at 50-51. Narayan further argues "the social standing of citizens should neither be
grounded in their ability to earn nor depend on their ability to 'contribute' to national life,
even if the scope of'contributions' is widened to include activities other than paid labor."
Id. at 50.
128.
Kimberk Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. Rav. 1331, 1380-81 (1988). Alan Freeman similarly argues: "[t]he assumption of'classlessness' presupposed by equal opportunity
theory is belied by the reality of our class structure, with its insidious and disempowering
reality of racism"Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A
CriticalLegal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 378-79 (1988).
129.
Crenshaw, supra note 128, at 1380-81.
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social inequality. Equal opportunity in employment should thus be understood as both a myth and an aspiration.
Ultimately, existing barriers to equal employment opportunity both
external and internal to the labor market act to further the subordinate
status of persons of color in our workforce. These barriers do not comport with a Constitution that promotes equal citizenship. Applying the
equal citizenship perspective to disparate impact analysis does not require
a choice between jurisprudence that seeks to ban either intentional discrimination or unequal outcomes. It might do either or both, depending
on the context of the situation. For example, one could say a workplace
treats its employees with respect and dignity and provides an equal opportunity to participate where that workplace is predominantly female or
predominantly Mexican American. 3° Ultimately, instead of looking solely
at the employer's intent or the effects of policies in isolation, an equal citizenship perspective puts a moral imperative at its center.
C. The Theory Employed in DisparateImpact Litigation
This Section explores how equal citizenship theory as applied to the
disparate impact standard might practically bring about the realization of
equal citizenship in the workplace. This Section briefly considers both a
constitutional challenge and a typical disparate impact lawsuit brought
under Title VII.
Without disturbing the current SectionV jurisprudence, there are at
least two ways to use an equal citizenship justification if faced with a constitutional challenge. First, the disparate impact standard can be justified as
reflecting a congressional understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
based on a theory of equal citizenship that is congruent and proportional
to the Court's intentionality standard. Alternatively, a case can be made
that the best understanding of the current judicial standard already contains the ideal of equal citizenship.
Assuming that Congress has the authority to argue that equal citizenship animates the Equal Protection Clause, the former approach is
probably the easier of the two. As discussed above, the Court has never
explicitly held that violations of the Equal Protection Clause may be
based on the equal citizenship principle in the way it is has held that violations of the Equal Protection Clause must be based on intentional
discrimination.
The aspiration of equal citizenship can justify the standard's constitutionality and can also inform judicial review of typical Title VII
disparate impact litigation. When viewed through the aspirational lens of
130.
However, as Professor Crenshaw recently asked an audience at the University of
Michigan Law School, why is racial proportionality not the baseline? Professor KimberlI
Williams Crenshaw, Address at the University of Michigan Law School (Spring 2004).
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equal citizenship, commonplace disparate impact cases can take on a
deeper meaning. These suits can be more meaningful to the extent that
they link individual disputes to the moral objective of facilitating equal
citizenship.
Lawsuits can tell stories and advance causes with deep moral themes.
If advocates justified their disparate impact suits with a theory of equal citizenship, disparate impact litigation outcomes could change. Litigants, juries,
and judges could attend to whether employees have been treated with
equal respect and dignity in the sense that they have been provided with
the same fundamental opportunities to participate in employment opportunities. If provided with a context to understand the standard as one that
reflects deep moral and societal norms of equal citizenship, individual cases
could be viewed in their more complex institutional contexts. Espousing
this position, Karst argues, "[t]he principle of equal citizenship is a general
principle that informs decisions by centering a court's attention
on the sub1' 31
stantive values of respect, responsibility, and participation."
This could come about in a variety of ways. First, evidence related
to subtle institutional inequalities that impede access to the workplace
could be admitted as relevant evidence in litigation. Such evidence would
allow the judge or jury to look through a broader structural lens at the
various ways in which race played out in the employment-related decision-making. Courts might allow plaintiffs to introduce and subsequently
rely on psychological and sociological evidence relating to subconscious
and unconscious bias.1 1 2 The moral story, in essence, places the individual
case within its broader social and institutional context.

131.
Karst, supra note 108, at 248 n.12. Elaborating on the point that the equal citizenship theory is not a judicial rule, Karst argues:
Equal citizenship is no absolute; nor does our constitutional rhetoric of
equality produce "nonolithic" judicial scrutiny of legislation ....
Indeed,
Justice Stevens, concurring in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 12 (1976),
called for an attitude exactly opposite to absolutism: one of interest balancing, weighing other considerations against the claim of constitutional
equality. What is required is a serious effort tojustify governmental imposition of inequalities, in proportion to the degree of invasion of the values of
equal citizenship. The critical point for our purposes is that those values, i.e.,
respect, responsibility, and participation, take the claim to equality out of the
realm of empty formalism and into a flesh-and-blood society where equality
matters.
Id.
132.
A range of evidence, particularly in the fields of cognitive and social- cognitive
psychology, explains the role unconscious racism plays in employment decision-making.
See Cason v. Nissan Motors Acceptance Corp., 212 ERD. 518 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Press
Release, National Consumer Law Center, Inc., Minority Auto Buyers Benefit from
NMAC Settlement (June 25, 2003), available athttp://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/
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Second, with respect to cases that challenge employment selection
criteria, courts might provide less deference to employers' articulations of
"business necessity." Currently, an employer can rebut an employee's
showing of disparate impact if it demonstrates that the challenged employment practice is job-related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity. The line of cases interpreting "business
necessity" might change in favor of plaintiff employees if courts are fundamentally focused on the moral concept of equality of citizenship.
The moral theme of equal citizenship should form the basis of any
defense of the disparate impact standard's constitutionality. Such an aspirational basis for the disparate impact standard does not easily translate to a
fixed judicial standard. However, considering evidence related to institutional biases and unconscious racism and giving less deference to an
employer's articulations of business necessity might change the outcomes
of disparate impact cases. Aspirational litigation and ideas can also shape
future norms.
IV WHO Is INTERPRETING EQUAL PROTECTION?

This Part addresses some of the institutional concerns raised by the
suggestion that the disparate impact standard should be justified as a tool
of equal citizenship. 33 This Part suggests that the Court's current Section
V jurisprudence is an attempt to assert the Court's substantive disagreement with Congress's understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
Part then argues that Congress should have the authority to promulgate
the disparate impact standard under its Section V power and justify it
through its own independent interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, this Part asserts that legislatures are better institutionally
equipped to advance the goals of the Equal Protection Clause and that
courts should therefore either interpret Boerne's congruence and proporsufficient room to experiment or else
tionality test to allow Congress
34
overturn the test altogether.'

Allowing the Court to constitutionalize the entire equal protection
debate without room for Congress to weigh in eliminates the ability for
the people to decide what policies-and justifications for those policiesbest advance equal protection. It is radically undemocratic. This freedom is
particularly troublesome in the area of antidiscrimination law because
whether policies ultimately advance equal protection is highly debatable
cocounseling/nmac press.shtml (employing evidence of unconscious bias in a consumer

lending discrimination lawsuit in the automobile sales industry) (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
133.
See Cass Sunstein & AdrianVermeule, Interpretationsand Institutions, 101 MicH. L.
RIv. 885, 948 (2003) (arguing generally that "issues of legal interpretation cannot be adequately resolved without attention to institutional questions").
134.
See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,452 (2000).
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and has changed-and will continue to change-over time. As Alan
Freeman recognizes, "the development of antidiscrimination law is an
ongoing dialogue ...between the concrete historical reality of oppression
and the principals generated by that experience."' 131 Indeed, our society's
race relations have dramatically changed over even the last thirty years and
will continue to change. The Rehnquist Court itself recently acknowlyear "deadline" for affirmative action
edged this in setting the twenty-five
36
policies in Grutterv. Bollinger.1
While legislatures are more able than the courts to respond to the
changing dynamics of race and power in contemporary America, the
Court has asserted itself as the exclusive interpreter of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the recent Section V jurisprudence. This jurisprudence
demonstrates that handing moral authority over to the Court represents
not only a loss of democratic integrity but also a loss of room to promote
an aspirational reading of the Fourteenth Amendment based on equal citizenship. In fact, the Court recently referenced The Civil Rights Cases... as
guiding authority even though our understanding of race and racial status
as a society has radically changed since the Court decided The Civil Rights
Cases. The Court proudly remains true to this vision of equalitythan 120 years ago-when even formal racial equality
articulated more
13
did not exist. 1
Robert Post and Reva Siegel argue that in the Boerne line of cases,
the Court has taken on "the task of cabining and inhibiting democratic
vindication of equality values."' 39 For this reason, they suggest the Boerne
congruence and proportionality test "is actually a tool for restraining
Congress whenever the Court is indifferent or hostile to the constitutional values at stake in particular instances of SectionV legislation. It is a
vehicle for the Court to express substantive disagreement with Congress's
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment .... , There is nothing in
the Constitution, however, that requires the Court to strike down congressional enactments because of such substantive disagreement; in fact,
history suggests that this is an unprecedented role for the Court. The assumption that the Court has always been the primary interpreter of the
Constitution is simply not true. 4 '
In addition to being institutionally equipped to respond to changes
in society, legislatures can enact proactive measures. They can experiment
135.

Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:A Critical

Legal Essay, 23 H9asv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295,320 (1988).
539 U.S. 306,310 (2003).
136.
137.
109 US. 3 (1883).
See Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v.Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 742 (2003).
138.
Post & Siegel, supra note 134, at 522.
139.
Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 25, at 15.
140.
See Kramer, supra note 25, at 15.
141.
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with rules in a way the courts cannot since courts must adjudicate the
precise issues before them. Post and Siegel suggest that "courts often adopt
liability rules to govern constitutional litigation that do not reflect the full
range of meanings that the Constitution's text might reasonably be understood to embody.' '14 2 They rely explicitly on what Sager has called the
"enforcement gap" or "the underenforcement of the Equal Protection
Clause by the federal courts."'143 This thesis holds that separation of powers
actually requires Congress to participate in the substantive definition of
the Equal Protection Clause, because as legislators, its members are better
able to represent the democratic will of the people. In this interpretative
space, the people's passions and moral sensibilities can become the foundation for constitutional interpretation.
It is commonly suggested that Congress is not the best protector of
minority rights because majority rule will trump minority interests. This
notion has long been a popular justification for judicial review. ' However, it is not necessarily the case that the majority's passions will trammel
minority rights in the legislature more than in the courts. For instance,
Congress historically has provided more substantive rights and opened
more doors of opportunity for people of color than has the Supreme
Court. Congress can be credited with passing far-reaching and meaningful legislation such as the Reconstruction-era statutes, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991. On the other hand, the Court is credited with expanding minority
rights and civil liberties only during the years of the Warren Court, an
anomaly in the history of the Court.
Certainly, Congress has not always vindicated the rights of people of
color. Yet handing over power to the Court is not the only remedy for a
legislature that does not adequately represent minority or less-powerful
interests. Kramer reminds us that the founders "did not solve the problem
of constitutional interpretation and enforcement by delegating it to
judges,"' 45 arguing, "[t]heir structural problems were meant to operate in
politics: elections, bicameralism, an executive veto, political connections
between state and national governments, and, above all, the capacity of
politicians with competing interests to appeal for support to the people
who made the Constitution. ' '
Delegating more power to Congress should not end judicial review.
The Court can and should still play a role in interpretation. Although
criticism of a court-centered model is warranted, on civil rights issues, it
is acceptable and even desirable for the courts to weigh in. On some level,
142.
143.

Post & Siegel, supra note 134, at 467.
Id.(citations omitted).

144.
145.
146.

See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
Kramer, supra note 25, at 162.
Id.

AND DISTRUST (1980).
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judges are more insulated from the majoritarian process and may espouse
views that, though politically unpopular, are useful to a collective understanding of the Constitution. The judicial skill of consistent application of
general principles to different fact patterns through a process of analogical
reasoning can illuminate modern understandings of the Constitution.
Further, there are judicial practices, such as the use of amicus curiae briefs,
that can enable the Court to integrate minority perspectives into its opinions. In these ways, the Court can continue to offer its perspective to the
understanding of the Constitution. Congress can listen to the Court at
the same time the Court listens to Congress.
While equal citizenship should inform the understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court's current understanding is deeply
rooted in the intentionality standard.Thus, the Court must reconsider the
Boerne congruence and proportionality test. Working to expand Congress's ability to legislate would allow Congress to enforce the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that maximizes the aspiration of
equal citizenship. Recent Section V case law represents a regression in this
area,' as it represents "the Justices' conviction that they and they alone
are responsible for the Constitution.' 45 In contrast, a strong institutional
dialogue between the Court and Congress should guide further constitutional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Formal equality did not achieve the realization of full and equal citizenship for all members of society. Subtle institutional factors continue to
foster exclusion and inequality based on race in America's workplaces.
The disparate impact standard represents one important tool in the attainment of the aspiration-and the moral imperative--of full and equal
citizenship for all citizens. Despite the pragmatic reasons for justifying the
disparate impact standard as a means of smoking out intentional discrimination, this narrow ground will constrain the ability to use the standard to
remedy institutional, subconscious, and unconscious discrimination.
The justification for the disparate impact standard should reflect the
theory that animates equal protection doctrine as a whole.This Note advocates a vision of equal protection grounded in a guarantee of equal
citizenship. To effectuate this end, Congress and the Court must both play
roles in substantively defining the Equal Protection Clause. Since racial
147.
Kramer argues that this is not limited to the SectionV cases. He also looks at, for
example, the Commerce Clause cases and Bush .Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), to argue that
history does not compel the Rehnquist Court's judicial sovereignty. Kramer, supra note 25,
at 163.
148.
Kramer, supra note 25, at 158.
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power, institutional factors, and morals that determine such power evolve
and change over time, our institutional process of creating and reviewing
antidiscrimination law must be equipped to deal with these changing social norms through the same "institutional dialogue within which
Americans have attempted to work out the meanings of national citizenship during the past half century."1 As an institutional matter, the Court
must either provide Congress with sufficient room to develop its own
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause or overturn the congruence and proportionality test altogether. Such changes will bring our
society closer to understanding the Equal Protection Clause as a legal and
moral commitment to equal respect and dignity for all persons.
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